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The main objectives of this paper are to measure total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the 
electricity supply industry in Peninsular Malaysia from 1975 to 2005 and to assess the impact of 
private entry reforms upon TFP in this industry. Prior to 1995, a government-linked, vertically-
integrated  electricity  utility,  Tenaga  Nasional  Berhad  (TNB),  was  essentially  the  sole  operator. 
However,  since  1995  privately-owned  Independent  Power  Producers  (IPPs)  have  also  begun 
generating electricity, all of which is purchased by TNB under fixed Power Purchase Agreements 
(PPAs). The introduction of IPPs has reduced the need for TNB to find finance for new power 
plants. It has been argued that the participation of IPPs in the electricity generation industry should 
also facilitate improvements in industry productivity; however this proposition is yet to be tested. In 
this study we calculate TFP growth using Törnqvist index methods, finding that there is no direct 
evidence of productivity improvements attributable to the privatization. Furthermore, it is not clear 
that consumers have benefited from this, since the PPAs have generally been quite generous to the 
IPPs in terms of risk sharing and prices paid. 
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1.  Introduction 
Before the deregulation era, electricity utilities in many countries were vertically integrated, owned 
and run by the government. It was generally believed that electricity utilities were natural monopolies 
because they required large fixed and sunk costs.
 However publicly owned utilities often operate 
inefficiently with high production costs due to a lack of incentives for cost saving (Nagayama, 2009; 
Sioshansi & Pfaffenberger, 2006). Moreover, in a number of cases government control and political 
intervention caused mediocre performance and wasteful resources (Shleifer, 1998). At least in part 
for  these  reasons,  we  have  seen  that  in  some  countries  vertically  integrated  utilities  have  been 
replaced by alternative market structures since the early 1990s. 
 
Electricity market reforms are expanding in the Asia Pacific region, in countries such as 
Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia. We can observe that some public 
ownership is being replaced by a privatized system in which previously vertically integrated functions 
have been disaggregated and some degree of competition has been introduced. The drawback of 
these  reforms  is  that  the  government  no  longer  has  the  authority  to  implement  restructuring 
especially in privatised monopolies (Newberry, 1999). In order to monitor the industries and avoid 
exploitation of consumers in competitive markets, regulatory bodies are established. For example, 
the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) in the United Kingdom (UK) is responsible for 
setting regulated prices in the non-competitive sections of energy businesses in the UK. They use 
econometric performance measurement methods to help them identify efficient price levels.  
 
In certain countries, this market reform leads to an opening-up of sections of the business to 
competition (e.g., generation), whilst the other parts still remain with the traditional monopoly utility 
(e.g., transmission and distribution). This scenario happened in the Malaysian Electricity Supply 
Industry (MESI), whereby competition was introduced in the generation sector whilst the other 
parts,  namely  transmission  and  distribution  activities,  are  still  a  monopoly  business  run  by  the 
government linked company, Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB).  
 
The electricity supply industry in Malaysia has been a monopoly and vertically integrated 
industry since 1949. The National Electricity Board (NEB) was corporatized and then privatized NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION 
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into  TNB  in  1990  and  1992,  respectively.  Due  to  the  large-scale  power  failure
1  in Peninsular 
Malaysia in 1992, several immediate actions were taken to improve the quality of electricity supply, 
such as allowing the private sector to enter the power generation sector by selling electricity to TNB 
based on a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). It has been argued that  the participation of these 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in the Malaysian electricity industry should facilitate TNB in 
raising its total factor productivity (TFP); however, this proposition is yet to be tested.  
 
In this study we measure total factor productivity growth in the Malaysian electricity supply 
industry from 1975-2005, with a particular interest in investigating the effect of the private entry 
reform described above. Our  most difficult task is the identification of sufficient quality data t o 
allow us to conduct a defensible analysis. Hence, we provide  a detailed discussion of input and 
output variables used in our analysis. This allows readers to judge the quality of our analysis, and 
should also provide a useful guide to other researchers w ho may be considering conducting similar 
empirical studies in the future. 
  
2.  The Malaysian Electricity Supply Industry 
Malaysia is a developing country that is located in Southeast Asia with the estimated population at 
27.61 million and a per capita income of US$6,896 in 2009 (Malaysia Statistics Department, 2009). 
The Malaysian electricity supply industry established the Central Electricity Board in 1949 (renamed 
later as National Electricity Board in 1965) as a publicly owned utility to generate, transmit and 
distribute electricity in Peninsular of Malaysia (see Figure 1).  In line with the privatization of other 
government agencies to ease the government‟s burden in raising capital, the privatization of the 
industry started when the National Electricity Board was corporatized in 1990 as TNB under the 
Electricity Act 1990 and subsequently privatized and floated on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 
with the Ministry of Finance holding about 70 percent of the shares.  
 
In the year 1992, there was a grave power crisis in Malaysia and it created concerns regarding 
the competence of TNB, the sole electricity provider.  The government began looking for the best-
suited model to safeguard the electricity industry. As a result, the government decided to relax 
industry regulation by  allowing the  entry  of  IPPs.  The Malaysian model of  deregulation of  the 
                                                 
1 On September 29, 1992 Malaysia suffered an electricity blackout that lasted two days and was caused by heavy storms 
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electricity supply industry was designed to meet various social and economic objectives: provide a 
safe, secure and adequate electricity supply, ensure affordable prices to the final consumers; and 
promote competition and improve industry performance. This policy resulted in the building of new 
power utilities, starting in 1995, by the private sector. With the involvement of the private sector, the 
government established the Department of Electricity and Gas Supply (JBE&G) in 1990 to monitor 

















Figure 1: Evolution of Malaysia Electricity Supply Industry 
Source: Ministry of Energy, Water and Communication (2005) 
 
A  single  buyer  model  is  used  in  the  Malaysia  electricity  supply  industry.  The  industry 
structure  is  separated  into  three  components,  namely  generation,  transmission  and  distribution. 
TNB, independent power producers and co-generators all generate electricity for consumers in the 
Malaysia. Nevertheless, TNB still monopolises the market of transmission and distribution in the 
Peninsular Malaysia. All the energy produced by the IPPs is purchased by TNB at a fixed price 
under a PPA, which are generally quite favourable to the IPPs (Smith, 2003). In general, the price set 
in the PPAs was higher compared to the TNB generation unit cost (refer to Table 1 and Table 2). NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION 
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Table 1: IPP Energy Payment Based on PPAs 
 
  IPP Energy Payment 
(MYR/KWh) 
1
st PPA (1993)  0.130-0.150 
2
nd PPA (1998)  0.110-0.125 
3
rd PPA (2002)  <0.110 
                Source: Energy Commission (2006, 2007) 
 
 
Table 2: TNB Generation Cost and IPP Energy Cost, 1997-2003 
 
  Energy Unit Cost (Thermal Power Plant Only) 
  IPPs (MYR/KWh)  TNB (MYR/KWh) 
1997  0.190  0.099 
0.113 
0.100 
1998  0.171 
1999  0.187 
2000  0.157  0.087 
2001  0.148  0.090 
2002  0.157  0.109 
2003  0.148  0.086 
    Source: Tenaga Nasional Berhad Annual Report (1998-2005); 
       Energy Commission (2006, 2007) 
  
Under this power purchase agreement, TNB makes two payments based on capacity and 
energy rates. There were three different versions of PPA in Malaysia. The first purchase agreement 
was signed based on the compulsory purchase concept where TNB pays the IPP a monthly fixed 
rate for 21 years regardless on whether TNB takes their electricity. As for the second and third types 
of purchase agreements, the „take and pay‟ concept was introduced, where TNB would pay the IPP 
only if TNB buys electricity generated by the IPP. The price set in the second and third PPAs was 
generally lower compared to the price in the first PPA. However, the capacity charge still applied in 
the second and third version of PPAs (refer to Table 1). Furthermore, all the cost of increases in fuel 
prices and loss of electricity during the transmission and distribution process are absorbed and paid 
by TNB. Overall, it is fair to say that the PPAs have generally been quite generous to the IPPs in 
terms of risk sharing and prices paid. 
  
In 2004, TNB generated 49.2 percent of the energy while the investor-owned independent 
power producers contributed nearly 50 percent, with the remaining small amount being produced by 
co-generation and self generation. In the year 2004, the total electricity generated was 96,060 giga-NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION 
 
6 
watt  hours  (Gwh)  with  a  generation  mix  of  gas  (66.5  percent),  coal  (23.5  percent),  hydro  (5.8 
percent)  and  the  rest  diesel  and  biomass  (Energy  Commission,  2006).  The  generation  mix  in 
Malaysia is different to other countries, such as Australia, Canada and United Kingdom, which 
mainly use coal, hydro and nuclear, respectively, in electricity generation. The number of electricity 
customers in Malaysia at the end of 2004 was 6.7 million, of which 83.4 percent were domestic 
customers followed by commercial (15.5 percent), industrial (0.4 percent) and the rest public lighting 
and mining (0.7 percent) (Energy Commission, 2006). 
 
3.  Literature Review 
 A large number of empirical studies had investigated the linkages between market reforms (i.e., 
liberalization, privatization etc) and TFP growth in the electricity industry (e.g., Atkinson & Halabi, 
2005; Domah & Pollitt, 2001; Estache & Rossi, 2005; Hjalmarsson & Veiderpass, 1992; Weyman-
Jones, 1991). However, the overall results tend to be mixed. There are a considerable amount of 
studies that support the proposition that privatization and liberalization could lead to improvements 
in  the  TFP  growth.  For  example,  Kleit  &  Terell  (2001)  employed  Bayesian  SFA  to  study  cost 
efficiency of 78 US power plants operating in 1996. Exogenous variables are specified as annual 
output  (MWh),  peak  output  (MWh),  fuel  price,  capital  price,  wages  while  total  costs  is  the 
endogenous  variable.  The  study  found  efficiency  gains  immediately  after  the  deregulation  and 
restructuring of the electricity industry in the US.  
 
Atkinson & Halabi (2005) show that in the case of Chile, privatization has been associated 
with improvements in technical efficiency and TFP growth. They gathered an unbalanced panel of 
monthly data from 16 hydroelectric plants in Chile from 1986 to 1997. The inputs for the model 
were the number of fulltime employees, capital stock (i.e., depreciated replacement value deflated by 
Chilean CPI), water consumption (thousand cubic meters per MWh) and the relative hydrologic 
conditions with gross electricity generated (MWh) as the output measure. The results of a SFA 
distance model obtained weighted annual TFP change of 4.61 percent over the sample period. The 
productivity growth is mainly driven by technical change of plus 3.08 percent per year, primarily 
because over utilization of labour (relative to capital and water) have been reduced effectively over 
the study period. 
 NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION 
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In  contrast,  Meibodi  (1998)  also  did  not  find  evidence  of  efficiency  gains  after  the 
privatization of the electricity industry. Their study used panel data for the period from 1987 to 1988 
to compare the performance of Iran‟s electricity generation industry with 26 other countries. The 
study suggested that the electricity industry in developing countries needed to reduce their cost of 
production to reach the production frontier. Moreover, market reforms, such as privatization, were 
not a good choice to resolve their industry‟s problem.  
 
This particular point is recognised by Yunos & Hawdon (1997) in the case of Malaysia. This 
study is the only empirical study (that we know of) that has measured the technical efficiency of the 
Malaysian electricity industry. They compared the performance of the electricity industry between 
National Electricity Board (NEB) in Malaysia (now is known as Tenaga Nasional Berhad, TNB) and 
26 other selected developing countries in 1987 and 1988. Nameplate generating capacity, labour, 
total system losses, capacity factor and gross electricity generated at the aggregate level were the 
variables used in their study. From the results of their DEA analysis, Malaysia is ranked 18
th out of 
27 countries with a technical efficiency score of 0.7042. Moreover, they also concluded that changes 
in ownership would not bring development to this industry without the existence of competition.. 
The similar conclusions also supported by Hjalmarsson & Veiderpass (1992) and Estache & Rossi 
(2005) for their electricity distribution studies.  
 
Although  a  number  of  studies  have  examined  productivity  and  efficiency  among  power 
utilities before and after deregulation, there has been little or no agreement on the relationship 
between privatization and total factor productivity growth. Moreover, this review of the literature 
revealed a dearth of electricity studies in Malaysia and thus arise the purpose to study while filling 
the research gap and guide for future research works. 
 
4.  Research Methodology 
A large number of the TFP measurement tools have been adopted in past empirical studies, as 
described in Section 3. The popular methods used to measure performance can be divided into two 
groups, price based index number methods and frontier methods (refer to Figure 2). In general, 
price-based index number methods make use of market prices, while frontier methods require a 
specifying a production technology and the application of implicit (shadow) prices is then reflected 
in the shape of the production frontier (Coelli et al., 2003). The index number methods have the NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION 
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advantage that they can be used when limited data are available, such as industry-level data, while 


















Figure 2: Total Factor Productivity Measurement Tools 
 
 
a)  Index Number Methods 
Price-based Index numbers use traditional index based techniques to aggregate input and output 
variables of the utilities. For example, using a Tornqvist or Fisher index number formula. In general, 
price information is used in constructing the aggregate indices. Price-based index numbers are a 
sensible choice when limited data are available. Index methods are generally applied when you only 
have access to data on one firm or a few firms. However, index methods require market price 
information and cannot be used to decompose TFP into components, such as technical change and 
technical efficiency (Coelli et al., 2003).  
 
b)  Frontier Methods 
Frontier methods require data on the input and output quantities used by a sample of firms. The 
estimated frontier is constructed to fit over the top of the data points. The technical efficiency score 
can be calculated by the distance from each observed data point to the efficient frontier. Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) are the two most frequently 
adopted  approaches  to  develop  efficient  production  frontiers.  Data  Envelopment  Analysis  uses 
linear programming methods to construct the frontier, while SFA uses econometric methods. With 
TFP Measurement 
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access to data on a number of firms over a number of time periods (panel data), one can estimate a 
sequence of frontiers over the different time periods and use the distance measures to construct 
Malmquist indices of TFP growth. See Coelli et al. (2003; 2005) for further details on the SFA, DEA 
and Malmquist TFP indices.   
 
Törnqvist Price-Index Number  
In this study we investigate the performance of a single integrated power utility.  Since no panel data 
are available, a price based-index number is appropriate for use in this study. Three index number 
formula are generally used in constructing quantity indices, namely the Laspeyres, Törnqvist and 
Fisher. The Törnqvist and Fisher indices provide second-order approximations to the underlying 
production technology, and hence are favoured relative to 1
st order indices, such as the Laspeyres 
(Coelli et al., 2005).  The choice between the Fisher and the Törnqvist indices is generally not 
crucial, since they tend to approximate each other quite closely when used to calculate changes over 
short periods, such as adjacent years.  In practice, the Törnqvist index seems to be preferred and 
used  in  many  empirical  studies  in  the  last  decade,  such  as  IPART  (1999)  and  Coelli  (2002). 
Therefore, we adopt the Törnqvist index to measure TFP change in Tenaga Nasional Berhad from 
1975 to 2005.  
 
The Törnqvist input quantity index is generally expressed in additive (log-change) form as: 
 





















st Q  is the Törnqvist input quantity index from period s (the base period) to period t, 
it  is the 
value share of the i-th input in the t-th period, 
it x  is the quantity of the i-th input in the t-th period. 
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Here we observe that the input quantity index is a weighted geometric mean of the index numbers 
for each component input, where the weights are the average cost shares in the two periods. In our 
study,  we  applied  this  formula  to  the  cost  share  and  revenue  share  with  the  input  and  output 
quantity data described in the next section to obtain Törnqvist input and output indices.  
 





  Törnqvist TFP Index =  Törnqvist Output Index  =          (3)  




where    is the input cost share in the relevant period for the relevant input,    is  the  output 
revenue share in the relevant period for the relevant output, x is the input quantity, and y is the 
output quantity.  
 
5.  Variable Choice 
In electricity supply studies, capital, labour, fuel, purchased power and maintenance services are 
generally chosen as input measures, while electricity delivered is often chosen as the output variable 
in the measurement of TFP. The price and quantity data are used to construct the respective input 
and output growth indices. We will begin with a discussion of each variable that assumes that we 
have no data constraints, and then follow with a discussion of the more usual situation where we 
have factor in the data restrictions 
 
Inputs 
a)   Labour 
The quantity of labour is generally measured using the number of full time equivalent employees 
(FTE).  This  measure  will  be  appropriate  if  there  have  been  no  substantial  changes  in  skill 
composition in the work force over time.  However, if the average skill level has risen (for example) 
then the FTE measure will provide a downward biased measure of the change in labour quantity 
over time.  If this is a concern, an ideal labour measure would involve the collection of data on FTE NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION 
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in various skill categories, such as cleaners, engineers, etc. and then the construction of an aggregate 
index (e.g., Törnqvist) given access to wages data in each of these categories also.   
 
  Unfortunately we do not have access to this type of data.  One alternative could be to take 
the data on total labour costs (which we have) and then deflate this by an appropriate labour price 
index to obtain an implicit quantity index. This will be a good measure if the relative wage rates for 
the various categories reflect their relative marginal products. Unfortunately, we do not have access 
to a suitable labour price index for this period, so this is not an option either.  Thus the quantity of 
labour used in this study is the number of full time equivalent employees and the implicit price of 
labour  is  calculated  by  dividing  labour  costs  by  the  quantity  of  labour.  Thus  we  are  implicitly 
assuming that the composition of labour has not changed significantly during this period. 
 
b)  Fuel  
Power plants use various fuel types, such as natural gas, coal, diesel, and crude oil.  In this study we 
aggregate fuel types by converting each one into a Petajoules (Pj) equivalent measure and then 
summing these. This aggregate measure of fuel quantity assumes that each Pj is equally “useful”.  
However, it could be argued that for some bulky fuels, such as coal, there are extra costs associated 
with handling the bulk and removing the ash.  One alternative is to take a measure of the total cost 
of fuels and then deflate this by a fuel price index to obtain an implicit quantity measure.  However, 
this approach would implicitly assume that the relative prices of the fuels reflected their productive 
contribution,  when  often  price  differences  are  driven  more  by  external  supply  and  demand 
conditions or government policies.  Furthermore, a fuel price index in Malaysia did not exist prior to 
1990, so this was not a feasible option in our case. 
 
  Perhaps an ideal fuel quantity measure would have involve the construction of a Törnqvist 
index measure using data on quantity and price for each fuel type, but unfortunately such detailed 
data was not available.  Thus we used the aggregate Pj quantity measure.  Fuel price was then 
obtained implicitly by dividing the total fuel cost by this quantity measure. 
 
c)  Capital  
While comparing this input to others, capital is probably the most complicated input to measure. 
The capital for instance, could be classified into different categories according to electricity activities, NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION 
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such as installed generation capacity for electricity generation, network length and total number of 
transformers for electricity transmission and distribution. It is widely believed that some capital 
assets (e.g., nameplate generating capacity) can deteriorate physically and hence provide less service 
over time. For this reason, the estimation cost for this particular type of input should reflect an 
annual average potential service flow that derives from the capital assets during its lifetime (Coelli et 
al., 2003). A variety of alternative ways to estimate capital have been adopted in past electricity 
industry studies.  
 
Depreciated replacement value is a popular proxy for the quantity of capital.  It has the 
advantage that the effects of inflation have been removed. For example, Goto and Tsutsui (2008), 
Filippini and Luchsinger (2007), Industry Commission (1992) adopted perpetual inventory method 
in estimating depreciated replacement values are follows: 
 
  t t t t t R I K K       1   (4) 
 
where  
  Kt, Kt-1 is the real depreciated capital stock in period t and period t-1, 
  It  is the real investment in period t,  
  t  is a real value of economic depreciation of capital stock in period t, and 
   is real retirements in asset in period t. 
 
Unfortunately, the depreciation value reported in company accounts does not always reflect 
the true diminution of the asset‟s usefulness (or productive capacity) but is more an accounting 
device. Although depreciation expenses are easy information to obtain from annual financial reports, 
different utilities may assume different asset lives or use different depreciation methods. In addition, 
this  measure  can  become  biased  when  lumpy  capital  investment  occurs.    This  is  because  the 
company can appear to have a lot of capital immediately after the building of a new large asset (e.g. a 
power plant) and then ten years later appear to have much less capital (because of depreciation) even 
though the actual productive capacity of the assets is near identical. 
 
For these reasons, the quantity of physical capital measured by the nameplate capacity is 
often used in empirical studies of electricity generation. Nameplate installed capacity is the full load NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION 
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capacity  rating  of  a  plant  to  continuously  produce  electricity.  Its  use  as  a  proxy  for  capital  is 
consistent with prior studies such as Kopp and Smith (1980), Fare et al. (1986), Golany et al. (1994), 
Coelli (2002) and Lam and Shiu (2004). The nameplate capacity for capital stock gets closer to the 
economic concept underlying production functions and avoids the problem of differing valuation 
techniques. However, nameplate capacity may not appropriate in analysis of vertically integrated 
utilities because they involve both generation and distribution activities. 
   
    In our assessment, the undepreciated replacement value of capital stock is the preferred choice 
in order to estimate the capital stock in a productivity study. In this study we have access to data on 
the nominal undepreciated capital stock, which helps avoid the depreciation problems but will suffer 
from inflation biases. As a consequence, we have attempted to convert this nominal capital stock 
data  into  real  (replacement)  values  by  using  a  weighted  average  price  index,  as  outlined  in  the 
following formulas:  
 
  t t t WPI C RC *    (5) 
 
where  
  RCt   is real undepreciated capital stock in time period t,  
  Ct  is nominal undepreciated capital stock at beginning of time period t,  







30  is weighted capital price index in period t, 
  PIt  is consumer price index, and 










 is weighted for WPI. 
 
In an ideal situation, a good quality capital price index would be used in the above calculations. But 
since a capital price index was not available prior to 1990, the consumer price index is used to proxy 
the capital price index in this study.  
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The price of a unit of capital “consumed” in a particular period is calculated using the rental price of 
capital (RPC):  
 


















    (6) 
 
where  
  Dt      is depreciation rate in period t, 
  gt        is three months Treasury bill rate in period t, 
  dPkt/Pkt   is the rate of capital gains in period t, and 
  WPIt     is weighted capital price index in period t. 
 
The rental price of capital index is widely used in TFP studies, such as Industry Commission 
(1992). In order to compute RPC in this study, we assumed 30 year asset lives for all TNB assets and 
hence the linear depreciation rate is equal to approximately 3.3 percent per annum. In addition, we 
also used the three months Treasury bill rate as the estimated opportunity cost of capital. This 
information can be obtained from IMF Statistic Database. Due to the data restriction described 
above, the rate of capital gains was computed on the basis of the consumer price index.   
 
d)  Other Inputs  
The “other inputs” category includes other expenses related to operating and maintaining power 
plants, transmission and distribution networks incurred over the period. Maintenance is always one 
necessary operation to keep the unit working economically and reliably. The expenditure of this 
category can be computed as the difference between total operating cost and the sum of fuel, labour, 
depreciation and interest expenses. This factor is a heterogeneous mixture of goods and services 
(e.g., office supplies, outsourced business services). The implicit quantity measure for “other inputs” 
is obtained by deflating the cost of other inputs by an appropriate price index.  In an ideal world we 
would have a price index constructed to reflect the diverse basket of goods and services included in 
this category, but unfortunately we did not have access to such information.  Hence, once again the 
CPI is used as a proxy. 
 NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION 
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In this study, our main analysis involves measuring the TFP of TNB.  However, in some 
extra calculations, we also measure the TFP of the full industry (TNB plus the IPPs).  This is done 
by adjusting the output measures (see below) and including power purchased from the IPPs into the 
“other inputs” category.  In this latter case, we do not use the CPI to deflate the other inputs cost, 
we instead use a Törnqvist price index that has been formed using the CPI and the average price 
level for the purchased power. 
 
Outputs 
The output of a vertically integrated electricity company is usually represented using the volume of 
electricity delivered.  However, electricity is not a homogenous commodity.  For example, it can be 
delivered in small quantities to residential customers or in large quantities to industrial customers 
(the  latter  generally  being  less  costly  per  unit),  and  can  be  delivered  into  densely  populated  or 
sparsely populated areas (the latter generally being more costly per unit).  In this study we do not 
have access to data on density, but we do have information on customer type and hence make use of 
it in our output measures. 
 
a)  Electricity Delivered 
Electricity delivered to residential and non residential customers in giga-watt hours (Gwh) are used 
as output quantity variables in this study.  Price data in Malaysia Ringgit (MYR) per Gwh is obtained 
implicitly by deflating revenues by these quantities. 
 
b)  Electricity Generated 
When a vertically integrated company generates all the power that it delivers, there is no need to 
include a power generation output variable as well.  However, in the case of TNB, we observe that 
after the introduction of the independent power producers in Malaysia in 1995, not all electricity 
delivered is generated by TNB‟s power plants.  Thus, total electricity generated from TNB will be 
included  as  an  output  variable  to  capture  these  changes.  The  price  of  each  unit  of  electricity 
generated  was  obtained  by  dividing  the  total  value  of  electricity  generation  by  total  electricity 
generated, yielding a price expressed in Malaysia Ringgit (MYR) per giga-watt hours. 
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However, when we do our additional calculations to measure TFP growth for the whole industry 
(TNB plus IPPs) we drop this extra output variable because it will be equal to the sum of the energy 
delivered measures (less any losses). 
 
6.  Empirical Analysis 
This section discusses the empirical analysis of total factor productivity growth of Tenaga Nasional 
Berhad from 1975 to  2005.  The availability of  data  and data sources  for each of  the variables 
proposed in this study are summarised in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Data Variables 
 
Variable  Quantity (Q)  Price (P)  Value (V) 
Capital    Undepreciated Real 
Capital Stock 
Rental Price of 
Capital   Quantity  Value 
Fuel   Petajoules  Value / Quantity  MYR 
Labour  Full Time Equivalent 
Employees   Value / Quantity  MYR 
Other Inputs  Value / Price  Consumer Price 
Index  MYR 
Residential Energy 
Delivered   Gwh  Value / Quantity  MYR 
Non Residential 
Energy Delivered   Gwh  Value / Quantity  MYR 
Electricity 
Generated  Gwh  Value / Quantity  MYR 
Note: The data is sourced from NEB/TNB Annual Reports, with the exception of CPI and interest rate data being 
sourced from the IMF.  
 
In order to shed some light on what factors have the largest influence on the TFP index, input cost 
shares and indices of the individual variable changes are plotted in Figures 3 to 6.  
 
6.1  TNB Input Cost Shares 
The electric utility industry is characterized by high capital expenditure and high fuel cost operational 
costs. For most utilities, fuel represents a large portion of operational costs, usually in the region of 
30-40 percent of total operating costs. Figure 3 displays the input cost shares as a percentage of total 
cost.  In the early part of the sample period, fuel expenses was a large contributor, being between NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION 
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50-75 percent of total costs, followed by capital costs (15-35 percent), other input costs (10-20 
percent) and labour (5-10 percent). One item of note is that, in the sample period from 1981 to 
1983, we can see that the capital cost share is less than 10 percent of total costs. This unusually low 
value is essentially due to the capital price index increasing at a higher than average rate during this 
period while interest rates are held artificially low.  As a result the real discount rate (g-dPk/Pk) is 
near zero or negative and hence the rental price of capital index and capital cost shares become 
smaller (refer to Figure 4).  
 
After  TNB  corporatization  and  the  introduction  of  IPPs,  TNB  input  cost  shares  have 
dramatically changed, especially in fuel costs. Prior to 1995, fuel costs represent around 40 percent 
of total costs. From Figure 3, we can see that the fuel costs share have reduced to 25-30 precent of 
total costs after market reforms. However, capital, labour and other input costs account for between 
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RPC Rate of Capital Gains D+g-dPk/Pk
 
Figure 4: Rental Price of Capital, Rate of Capital Gains, D+g-dPk/Pk 
   
Note: D is depreciation 
            g is opportunity cost of holding capital 
                        dPk/Pk is rate of capital gains 
 
6.2  Indices of Input and Output Variable Changes 
Indices of input change and output change were calculated for each quantity variable and are plotted 
in Figure 5 and Figure 6. In Figure 5, we observe that the indices for capital stock and other input 
costs have a similar trend which increases slowly in the first half of the sample period and then 
accelerates in the latter half of the period.  Overall, the average annual rates of growth are 9.8 
percent and 9.6 percent, respectively over the sample period. During the same period, labour has 
increased by only 2.7 percent per annum, where the index increases slowly over the full sample 
period. Finally, we observe that fuel consumption grew by 8.1 percent per year. However, the index 
of fuel changes was lower during the post privatization period relative to the previous period, due to 




















































































































































Figure 5: Input Indices, 1975-2005  
 
  Output indices are presented in Figure 6, where we see that the average annual increase in 
residential  energy  supplied  was  13.9  percent  prior  to  TNB  corporatization,  while  the  average 
increase in the period after the market reforms was 9.7 percent. The pattern for non residential 
energy supplied was similar to residential energy supplied with average changes of 9.7 percent and 
10.1 percent, respectively. However, these rates are not significantly different at the five percent 
level. For electricity generated, TNB had an average total growth of 9.9 percent before 1990. After 


















































































































































Figure 6: Output Indices, 1975-2005  
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6.3  TFP Results 
As mentioned earlier,  we wish to compare the  total factor  productivity growth of TNB in  the 
periods before and after privatization and after the introduction of independent power producers. 
We have decided that four inputs and three outputs will be used in our TFP analysis for TNB from 
1975 to 2005. The inputs for the model were capital, fuel, labour, and other inputs. Residential and 
non residential energy supplied and TNB electricity generated were identified as the outputs of the 
study. It is important to highlight that IPP energy cost is not added in order to measure TFP of 
TNB. A number of comments can be made regarding the results in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Average Annual TFP Growth Rates of TNB, 1975-2005 
 
  Average TFP Growth 
Full Period (1975-2005)  0.53% 
Pre TNB Corporatization (1975-1990)  0.86% 
Post TNB Corporatization (1990-2005)  0.21% 
Post IPP Participation (1995-2005)  -1.15% 
 
 
Prior to TNB corporatization, we obtained an average annual TFP growth of 0.86 percent 
over the first 15-year period. After National Electricity Board was corporatized and privatized in 
1990, the TFP index of the Tenaga Nasional Berhad has changed notably. To illustrate the effect of 
TNB corporatization, we  have plotted indices of TFP in Figure 7.  The TFP index  for  Tenaga 
Nasional Berhad has increased from 0.834 in 1990 to 1.054 in 1994. This improvement of total 
factor productivity for TNB between 1990 and 1994 could perhaps be attributed to the privatization 
















































































































































Tornqvist Input Index Tornqvist Output Index Tornqvist TFP Index
 
Figure 7: Törnqvist TFP Index of Tenaga Nasional Berhad, 1975-2005 
 
From 1995 onwards, the private sector was allowed to enter the generation sector by selling 
electricity to TNB based on Power Purchase Agreements (PPA). When the private entry occurs, we 
observe that TFP for TNB reduces to 0.86, which suggested that private entry has a negative 
relationship with productivity growth. Table 4 indicates that TNB  obtained an average TFP change 
of minus 1.15 percent over the last 10-year period. This finding corroborates Pollitt‟s (1999) claim 
that the positive growth in productivity need not be a direct consequence of privatization. 
 
6.4  Sensitivity Analysis 
The previous of TFP results relate to our preferred model, where undepreciated capital stock is used 
to proxy capital and a weighted price index is adopted to deflate undepreciated capital stock. The 
following discussion will allow us to compare the Törnqvist TFP results when we use a different 
capital measure and an alternative model specification.  
 
a)  Alternative Capital Measure – Perpetual Inventory Method 
As we discussed in our discussion of capital, the perpetual inventory method is a popular approach 
in estimating depreciated replacement value. To obtain a better idea of the effect of different capital 
measures upon our TFP results, information on input cost shares, indices of capital stock and TFP 
indices are presented in Appendix B. The two indices of capital stock changes based on the different 
capital measures are plotted on the one graph in Figure A2. In this figure we observe that the two NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION 
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indices  have  a  quite  similar  trend  in  first  half  of  the  sample  period.  However,  after  TNB  was 
corporatized and privatized, a gap between these two indices develops, with the PIM index being 
slightly lower.  This is perhaps due to the fact that capital investment (in generation plant) slowed 
after IPP entry and hence the PIM will tend to depreciate the existing capital items so that the 
amount of capital available is apparently lower than the reality.  
 
To illustrate the effect of the use of  perpetual inventory method, we have plotted TFP 
indices in Figure A3. We see that average annual TFP change of TNB over 30 years is slightly lower 
at 0.38 percent per year (refer to Table 5). However, overall the two TFP indices tell quite a similar 
story.  Thus we can conclude that, in our case, the alternative capital measures do not influence our 
results in a notable manner.  This is most likely because capital investment has been steadily rising 
during the sample period, with no substantial “lumpiness”.   Hence our results seem to be robust to 
our choice of capital measure. 
 
Table 5: Sensitivity Results: Average Annual TFP Growth Rates, 1975-2005 
 







2 Output Model3 
(TFP Industry)  
Full Period (1975-2005)  0.53%  0.38%  0.19% 
Pre TNB Corporatization 
(1975-1990)  0.86%  0.67%  0.55% 
Post TNB Corporatization 
(1990-2005)  0.21%  0.01%  -0.75% 
Post IPP Participation  
(1995-2005)  -1.15%  -1.39%  -2.49% 
Notes:  
1: Weighted capital price index is adopted to deflate capital stock 
2: Value Annual User Charge is applied to calculate capital price 
3: Two Outputs: Residential energy and non residential energy   
 
b)  Industry-level Model Specification   
In this extra analysis we aim to measure TFP growth for the whole electricity supply industry in 
Peninsular Malaysia (i.e., both TNB and the IPPs).  In terms of our TFP model, this is achieved by 
excluding the electricity generated output and adding in the power purchase costs into “other inputs‟ 
measure. One would expect the index of “other inputs” would change noticeably when we combine 
other costs with power purchased cost in this case. From Figure B1, we observe that input cost NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION 
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shares have dramatically changed after the introduction of IPPs in 1995. On the other hand, capital 
and fuel costs account for between 15-30 percent and 15-20 percent over this latter period. From 
Table 5, we observe an average TFP change of plus 0.55 percent prior to TNB corporatization. 
During the post IPP participation, we see that average annual TFP change over this industry is equal 
to a 2.45 percent decline per year. Thus, these results suggest that privatization and introduction of 
IPPs did not imply increases in productivity or decreases in production costs. More detailed results 
for this model are provided in Appendix B. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
In this study we provide a comprehensive productivity study for the Malaysian electricity supply 
industry. We use a Törnqvist index to measure total factor productivity growth for TNB and the 
electricity supply industry in Peninsular Malaysia over the 30 year period from 1975 to 2005. TNB 
obtains an average annual TFP change of plus 0.53 percent and the industry obtains an average TFP 
change of plus 0.13 percent over the full sample period. Furthermore, the result from the Törnqvist 
index method shows that the existence of IPPs in the Malaysian electricity supply industry is perhaps 
a contributing factor in TNB‟s productivity level falling, with a declining TFP index beginning from 
1996.  
 
Thus we find no direct evidence to allow us to conclude that positive changes in productivity 
are attributable to the privatization. Therefore, we suggest that privatization by itself is not sufficient 
to increase total factor productivity and it has to be accompanied by either the introduction of 
competitive  markets  or  a  regulatory  framework  that  encourages  more  efficient  behaviour.  The 
Malaysian electricity market is not fully competitive because there is only one buyer. If there is more 
competition, such as contracts established through tendering process, a spot market, or more buyers 
being able to purchase the electricity in the market, we believe that power utilities and consumers 
could benefit from this regulatory change.  
 
We  noted  that  a  variety  of  alternative  ways  to  estimate  capital  stock,  such  as  an 
undepreciated real capital stock approach and the perpetual inventory method, are available for use 
in TFP studies such as these. From our sensitivity analysis, we observe that the selection of a capital 
measure  does  not  have  are  large  effect  upon  the  empirical  results  obtained  in  our  study.  In 
discussing possible measures for our variables, we observed that many of the “ideal” input and NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION 
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output measures are difficult to be put in practice because of insufficient quality data. For example, a 
labour  measure  should  ideally  attempt  to  take  account  of  differences  in  skills  and  expertise. 
Furthermore, the choice of good price deflators is crucial in productivity studies, such as this, where 
the use of one or more value measures is generally unavoidable. The consumer price index should 
generally be used as a last resort  if better price information is not available. Thus, we wish to 
emphasise that further work on data measurement in needed to allow us to be more confident in our 
conclusions regarding the impact of introduction of privatization and competition on total factor 
productivity in this industry.  
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Figure B4: Törnqvist TFP Index of Electricity Supply Industry in Peninsular Malaysia, 1975-2005 
 
 